"CIA Missed Chances to Tackle al-Qaida"

Tuesday, August 21, 2007

CIA Missed Chances to Tackle al-Qaida
By KATHERINE SHRADER
The Associated Press
  
 
WASHINGTON - The CIA's top leaders failed to use their available powers,
never developed a comprehensive plan to stop al-Qaida and missed crucial
opportunities to thwart two hijackers in the run-up to Sept. 11, the
agency's own watchdog concluded in a bruising report released Tuesday.

Completed in June 2005 and kept classified until now, the 19-page executive
summary finds extensive fault with the actions of senior CIA leaders and
others beneath them. "The agency and its officers did not discharge their
responsibilities in a satisfactory manner," the CIA inspector general found.

"They did not always work effectively and cooperatively," the report stated.

Yet the review team led by Inspector General John Helgerson found neither a
"single point of failure nor a silver bullet" that would have stopped the
attacks that killed nearly 3,000 people.

In a statement, CIA Director Michael Hayden said the decision to release the
report was not his choice or preference, but that he was making the report
available as required by Congress in a law President Bush signed earlier
this month.

"I thought the release of this report would distract officers serving their
country on the front lines of a global conflict," Hayden said. "It will, at
a minimum, consume time and attention revisiting ground that is already well
plowed."

The report does cover terrain heavily examined by a congressional inquiry
and the Sept. 11 Commission. However, the CIA watchdog's report goes further
than previous reviews to examine the personal failings of individuals within
the agency who led the pre-9/11 efforts against al-Qaida.

Helgerson's team found that no CIA employees violated the law or were part
of any misconduct. But it still called on then-CIA Director Porter Goss to
form accountability boards to look at the performance of specific
individuals to determine whether reprimands were called for.

The inquiry boards were recommended for officials including former CIA
Director George Tenet, his deputy director for operations Jim Pavitt,
Counterterrorism Center Chief Cofer Black, and agency Executive Director
A.B. "Buzzy" Krongard.

In October 2005, Goss rejected the recommendation. He said he had spoken
personally with the current employees named in the report, and he trusted
their abilities and dedication. "The report unveiled no mysteries," Goss
said.

Hayden stuck by Goss's decision.

Providing a glimpse of a series of shortfalls laid out in the longer,
still-classified report, the executive summary says:

  U.S. spy agencies, which were overseen by Tenet, lacked a comprehensive
strategic plan to counter Osama bin Laden prior to 9/11. The inspector
general concluded that Tenet "by virtue of his position, bears ultimate
responsibility for the fact that no such strategic plan was ever created."

  The CIA's analysis of al-Qaida before Sept. 2001 was lacking. No
comprehensive report focusing on bin Laden was written after 1993, and no
comprehensive report laying out the threats of 2001 was assembled. "A number
of important issues were covered insufficiently or not at all," the report
found.

  The CIA and the National Security Agency tussled over their
responsibilities in dealing with al-Qaida well into 2001. Only Tenet's
personal involvement could have led to a timely resolution, the report
concluded.

  The CIA station charged with monitoring bin Laden - code-named Alec
Station - was overworked, lacked operational experience, expertise and
training. The report recommended forming accountability boards for the CIA
Counterterror Center chiefs from 1998 to 2001, including Black.

  Although 50 to 60 people read at least one CIA cable about two of the
hijackers, the information wasn't shared with the proper offices and
agencies. "That so many individuals failed to act in this case reflects a
systemic breakdown.... Basically, there was no coherent, functioning
watch-listing program," the report said. The report again called for further
review of Black and his predecessor.

While blame is heaped on Tenet and his deputies, the report also says that
Tenet was forcefully engaged in counterterrorism efforts and personally
sounded the alarm before Congress, the military and policymakers. In a now
well-known 1998 memo, he declared, "We are at war."

The trouble, the report said, was follow-up.

In a statement, Tenet said the inspector general is "flat wrong" about the
lack of plan.

"There was in fact a robust plan, marked by extraordinary effort and
dedication to fighting terrorism, dating back to long before 9/11," he said.
"Without such an effort, we would not have been able to give the president a
plan on Sept. 15, 2001, that led to the routing of the Taliban, chasing
al-Qaida from its Afghan sanctuary and combating terrorists across 92
countries."

The inspector general did take exception to findings of Congress' joint
inquiry into 9/11. For instance, the congressional inquiry found that the
CIA was reluctant to seek authority to assassinate bin Laden. Instead, the
inspector general believed the problem was the agency's limited
covert-action capabilities.

The CIA's reliance on a group of sources with questionable reliablity
"proved insufficient to mount a credible operation against bin Laden," the
report said. "Efforts to develop other options had limited potential prior
to 9/11."

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