"Aviation Security: Management Challenges Remain for the TSA's Secure Flight Program"

Thursday, August 10, 2006

Aviation Security: Management Challenges Remain for the TSA's Secure Flight
Program
General Accounting Office Reports & Testimony


After the events of September 11, 2001, the Transportation Security
Administration (TSA) assumed the function of passenger prescreening--or the
matching of passenger information against terrorist watch lists to identify
persons who should undergo additional security scrutiny--After the events of
September 11, 2001, the Transportation Security Administration (TSA) assumed
the function of passenger prescreening, which is currently performed by the
air carriers. To do so, TSA has been developing Secure Flight. This
testimony covers TSA's progress and challenges in (1) developing, managing,
and overseeing Secure Flight; (2) coordinating with key stakeholders
critical to program operations; (3) addressing key factors that will impact
system effectiveness; and (4) minimizing impacts on passenger privacy and
protecting passenger rights.

For over 3 years, TSA has faced challenges in developing and implementing
the Secure Flight program, and in early 2006, it suspended Secure Flight's
development to reassess, or rebaseline, the program. TSA's rebaselining
effort is currently under way, and final decisions regarding the future
direction of the program have not been made. In our most recent report and
testimony, we noted that TSA had made some progress in developing and
testing the Secure Flight program, but hadnot followed a disciplined life
cycle approach to manage systems development or fully defined system
requirements. We also reported that TSA was proceeding to develop Secure
Flight without a program management plan containing program schedule and
cost estimates. Oversight reviews of the program had also raised questions
about program management. Secure Flight officials stated that as they move
forward with therebaselined program, they will be following a more rigorous
and disciplined life cycle process for Secure Flight. We support TSA's
rebaselining effort, and believe that the agency should not move forward
with the program until it has demonstrated that a disciplined life cycle
process is being followed. We also reported that TSA had taken steps to
collaborate with Secure Flight stakeholders whose participation is essential
to ensuring that passenger and terrorist watch list dataare collected and
transmitted to support Secure Flight. However, keyprogram
stakeholders--including the U.S. Customs and Border Protection, the
Terrorist Screening Center, and air carriers--stated that they needed more
definitive information about system requirements from TSA to plan for their
support of the program. In addition, we reportedthat several activities that
will affect Secure Flight's effectiveness were under way or had not yet been
decided. For example, TSA conducted name-matching tests that compared
passenger and terrorist screening database information to determine what
type of passenger data would be needed for Secure Flight's purposes.
However, TSA had not yet made key policy decisions that could significantly
impact program operations, including what passenger data it would require
air carriers to provide and the name-matching technologies it would use.
Further, Secure Flight's system development documentation did not fully
identify how passenger privacy protections were to be met, and TSA had not
issued the privacy notices that described how it would protect passenger
data once Secure Flight became operational. As a result, it was not possible
to assess how TSA is addressing privacy concerns. Secure Flight officials
stated that they plan to address privacy issues and finalize its redress
polices in conjunction with rebaselining the program.

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