"Wider 9/11 terror plans revealed: Envisioned a plot with 10 hijacked planes"

Friday, June 18, 2004

Wider terror plans revealed 
BY CURT ANDERSON
The Associated Press 


WASHINGTON - Contradicting White House claims, the independent
commission investigating the Sept. 11 attacks said Wednesday no evidence
exists that al-Qaida had strong ties to Saddam Hussein. In hair-raising
detail, the commission said the terror network had envisioned a much
larger attack and is working hard to strike again. 

Although Osama bin Laden asked for help from Iraq in the mid-1990s,
Saddam's government never responded, according to a report by the
commission staff based on interviews with intelligence and law
enforcement officials. The report asserted "no credible evidence" has
emerged that Iraq was involved in the Sept. 11 strikes.

Al-Qaida is actively trying to replicate the destruction of that day,
the report said, though the terrorist network has been weakened by
losing its sanctuary in Afghanistan and many leaders to U.S. strikes and
arrests. The organization also is trying to obtain a nuclear weapon and
is "extremely interested" in chemical, radiological and biological
attacks, including anthrax, it said.

The commission staff said that Sept. 11 mastermind Khalid Shaikh
Mohammed initially outlined an attack involving 10 aircraft targeting
sites on both U.S. coasts, including Seattle. Mohammed proposed that he
pilot one of the planes, kill all the male passengers, land the plane at
a U.S. airport and make a "speech denouncing U.S. policies in the Middle
East before releasing all the women and children," the report said.

Bin Laden rejected that plan as too complex, deciding instead on four
aircraft piloted by handpicked suicide operatives. The report said the
targets were chosen based on symbolism: the Pentagon, which represented
the U.S. military; the World Trade Center, a symbol of American economic
strength; the Capitol, the perceived source of U.S. support for Israel;
and the White House. Training began in 1999.

The attacks were planned for as early as May 2001, but they were pushed
back to September, partly because al-Qaida sought to strike when
Congress would be at the Capitol. A second wave of hijackings never
materialized because Mohammed was too busy planning the Sept. 11
attacks, according to the report.

Under questioning, John Pistole, the FBI's top counterterrorism
official, told the commission that the government "has probably
prevented a few aviation attacks" in the United States since Sept. 11
but that some operatives in those plots are still at large.

The findings were released as the commission began its final two days of
hearings on the terror attacks that killed nearly 3,000 people. Today's
hearings will focus on the Federal Aviation Administration and U.S. air
defenses. The commission's final report is due July 26.

Commission member Bob Kerrey, a former Democratic senator from Nebraska,
expressed exasperation that the government did not act with greater
urgency against bin Laden, given what was known about al-Qaida before
2001.

"I believe that we missed a tremendous opportunity very early in this
game to inform the Congress, inform the American people who bin Laden
was, what he was doing, what he had done and as a consequence I think we
simply didn't rally until it was too late," Kerrey said.

The conclusions that al-Qaida and Iraq had no cooperative relationship
run counter to repeated assertions by President Bush, Vice President
Dick Cheney and other administration officials. The claims that bin
Laden and Saddam were in league were central to the administration's
justification for going to war in Iraq.

As recently as Monday, Cheney said in a speech that the Iraqi president
"had long-established ties with al-Qaida." Last fall he cited what he
called a credible but unconfirmed intelligence report that Mohamed Atta,
ringleader of the 19 Sept. 11 hijackers, met in Prague, Czech Republic,
with a senior Iraqi intelligence official before the attacks.

The commission concluded no such meeting occurred.

Secretary of State Colin Powell, asked about the commission report, said
the administration stands by its assertions of links between al-Qaida
and Iraq.

"I think we have said, and it is clear, that there is a connection, and
we have seen these connections between al-Qaida and the regime of Saddam
Hussein and we stick with that," Powell told Arab TV channel al-Jazeera.
"We have not said it was related to 9/11."

The White House released an Oct. 7, 2002, letter from the CIA to
then-Senate Intelligence Committee Chairman Bob Graham (D-Fla.) citing
"solid reporting" of an Iraq-al-Qaida relationship "going back a decade"
and credible reports that al-Qaida sought contacts in Iraq that might
help it acquire the capability to use weapons of mass destruction.

The letter, released by Cheney's office, said much of the information
came from detainees, including some of high rank.

The commission report said bin Laden, then in Sudan, met with an Iraqi
intelligence officer in 1994 to request space for al-Qaida training
camps and help obtaining weapons, "but Iraq apparently never responded."
The meeting occurred though bin Laden opposed Saddam's secular
government and had sponsored anti-Saddam operatives in Iraq's Kurdish
region.

The camps that were established in Afghanistan after bin Laden moved
there in 1996 produced as many as 20,000 al-Qaida operatives and
encouraged trainees to "think creatively about ways to commit mass
murder," the report said.

Some of the ideas included taking over a missile launcher and forcing
Russians to fire a nuclear device at the United States, mounting mustard
gas or cyanide attacks against Jewish areas in Iran, releasing poison
gas into a building ventilation system - and "last, but not least,
hijacking an aircraft and crashing it into an airport or nearby city."

The Sept. 11 plot evolved from Mohammed's vision but was hardly a
seamless operation, the commission report said. Mohammed, who is in U.S.
custody at an undisclosed overseas location, wanted up to 26 operatives
for the four-plane plot, but at least 10 were prevented from entering
the United States by visa problems, family objections and other reasons.

SIDEBAR: Timeline of events leading up to 9/11

As described by the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the
United States:

   Mid-1996: Khalid Shaikh Mohammed meets with Osama bin Laden in
Afghanistan. He presents several ideas for attacks against the United
States. Bin Laden does not commit himself.

   1998: Mohamed Atta and Marwan al-Shehhi share an apartment with Ramzi
Binalshibh in Hamburg, Germany.

   Early 1999: Bin Laden summons Mohammed to Kandahar, Afghanistan, to
discuss using aircraft as weapons. They develop a list of targets
including the White House, the Pentagon, the Capitol and the World Trade
Center. Bin Laden provides Mohammed with four suicide operatives,
including Khalid al-Mihdhar and Nawaf al-Hazmi.

   Late 1999: Most of the future "muscle hijackers" - those responsible
for subduing passengers - begin making their way to camps in
Afghanistan. Most return to their home country of Saudi Arabia to obtain
visas, then return to Afghanistan for training.

   November-December 1999: Atta, Ziad Jarrah, al-Shehhi and Binalshibh
travel separately to Afghanistan. Bin Laden's deputy, Mohamed Atef,
later directs Atta, Jarrah and Binalshibh to return to Germany and
enroll in flight training. Atta is chosen as leader of mission.

   2000: Hani Hanjour arrives at an al-Qaida camp in Afghanistan, is
identified as a pilot, and sent to Mohammed to be included in plot.

   Jan. 15, 2000: Al-Mihdhar and al-Hazmi enter United States.

   Feb. 5: Al-Hazmi and al-Mihdhar move to San Diego to learn English
and enroll in flight schools.

   March: Al-Shehhi, Atta, Jarrah and Binalshibh begin researching
flight schools in Germany, but find training in United States would be
cheaper and faster. Atta, al-Shehhi and Jarrah obtain U.S. visas, but
Binalshibh is rejected.

   May: Al-Shehhi, Jarrah and Atta begin arriving in United States. They
enroll in flight schools in Venice, Fla.

   Sept. 25: Hanjour obtains a U.S. student visa, then travels to United
Arab Emirates to receive money.

   Late 2000: Atta, Jarrah and al-Shehhi begin training on jet aircraft
simulators.

   Early 2001: Atta, Jarrah and al-Shehhi leave United States on various
foreign trips. Atta meets with Binalshibh in Germany. Binalshibh then
heads to Afghanistan to brief al-Qaida leadership. Al-Shehhi takes an
eight-day trip to Casablanca, Morocco.

   April: "Muscle hijackers" start arriving in United States.

   May 24: Al-Shehhi, Jarrah and Atta begin taking cross-country
surveillance flights and additional flight training.

   July 4: Al-Mihdhar re-enters United States, joins Hanjour and
al-Hazmi in Paterson, N.J.

   Mid-July: Atta meets with Binalshibh in Spain. Atta reports they have
been able to carry box-cutters onto test flights.

   Aug 26: Conspirators begin buying flight tickets.

   Sept. 7: Atta flies from Fort Lauderdale, Fla., to Baltimore,
presumably to meet with hijack team staying in Laurel, Md.

   Sept. 9: Atta flies from Baltimore to Boston, where al-Shehhi and his
hijack team are stationed.

   Sept. 10: Atta picks up Abdul Aziz al-Omari, a muscle hijacker, from
Boston hotel and drives to Portland, Maine. They take commuter flight
the next morning to Boston. Other hijack teams gather in Herndon, Va.,
close to Dulles Airport, and Newark, N.J.

   Sept. 11: American Airlines Flight 11 from Boston, headed to Los
Angeles, crashes into World Trade Center's North Tower. Atta is believed
to be the pilot. United Airlines Flight 175 from Boston, headed to Los
Angeles, crashes into World Trade Center's South Tower. Al-Shehhi is the
believed pilot. American Flight 77 from Dulles Airport, headed to Los
Angeles, crashes into Pentagon. Hanjour is believed to be the pilot.
United Flight 93 from Newark Airport to San Francisco crashes in
Pennsylvania. Jarrah is thought to have been the pilot. Washington is
thought to have been the intended target.

SIDEBAR: Report highlights

Highlights from reports, released Wednesday by the Sept. 11, 2001,
commission, on al-Qaida's operations and the terrorist plot:

   .Osama bin Laden and then-Iraqi President Saddam Hussein did not
appear to have a collaborative relationship. A senior Iraqi intelligence
official reportedly met with bin Laden in 1994 in Sudan, and there have
been reports that contacts between Iraq and al-Qaida also occurred after
bin Laden returned to Afghanistan. But Iraq apparently never responded
to a request from bin Laden for weapons and space to establish training
camps. Two senior bin Laden associates adamantly have denied ties
existed between al-Qaida and Iraq and there is "no credible evidence"
Iraq and al-Qaida cooperated on attacks against the United States.

   .Khalid Shaikh Mohammed, the mastermind of the attacks, envisioned a
plot with 10 hijacked planes. Mohammed, who is in U.S. custody, told
interrogators he proposed killing male passengers aboard, landing at a
U.S. airport and making a "speech denouncing U.S. policies in the Middle
East before releasing all the women and children." After bin Laden
rejected that plan, Mohammed wanted U.S. commercial planes in Asia to be
hijacked at the same time as the U.S. hijackings. Those planes would
have exploded in flight or been crashed into U.S. targets in Asia. Bin
Laden vetoed it because synchronization would have been too difficult.

   .Bin Laden wanted the fourth plane to strike the White House, but
Atta said it would be too difficult to hit and wanted to hit the
Capitol. Eventually, Atta agreed to the White House but kept the Capitol
in reserve. Based on other exchanges between the hijackers, it remains
unclear which was the target on Sept. 11.

   .Al-Qaida intended to use 25 or 26 hijackers for the plot, instead of
the 19 who took part. The commission identified at least nine "candidate
hijackers" who were supposed to be part of the attacks at one time.

   .There is no evidence the Saudi Arabian government or senior
officials within it funded al-Qaida. However, al-Qaida was able to get
money from Saudi charities that, until recently, were subject to little
oversight. Since the Sept. 11 attacks, al-Qaida's funding has decreased
and its organization decentralized due to bin Laden's seclusion.

   .The Sept. 11 date was chosen about three weeks before the attacks.
Bin Laden wanted the attacks as early as mid-2000 and told Mohammed it
would be sufficient to down the planes and not hit specific targets.
Mohammed argued the operation wouldn't be successful unless the pilots
were trained and the hijacking teams larger. Bin Laden later wanted to
time the attacks for May 12, 2001, the seven-month anniversary of the
USS Cole bombing. Then he wanted it to take place when Israeli Prime
Minister Ariel Sharon was visiting in June or July 2001. Both times, the
hijackers were not ready.

   .Al-Qaida remains interested in conducting chemical, biological,
radiological, or nuclear attacks. In 1994, al-Qaida operatives attempted
to buy uranium for $1.5 million; the uranium proved to be fake. Al-Qaida
had a biological weapons program and was making advances in its ability
to produce anthrax before Sept. 11. Similarly, al-Qaida might try to
conduct a chemical attack by using widely available industrial
chemicals, or by attacking a chemical plant or a shipment of hazardous
materials.

The Associated Press


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