"Mombasa attack highlights increasing MANPADS threat"

Wednesday, February 12, 2003

Mombasa attack highlights increasing MANPADS threat 
By David A Kuhn 
Jane's Intelligence Review


The failed attack that occurred in Mombasa, Kenya, on the Arkia Airlines
757-300 on 28 November 2002 is a disturbing marker in the terrorist
procurement and deployment of military stand-off weapons against civilian
targets and infrastructure. 

It was not the first terrorist attack against civilians using manportable
air defence systems (MANPADS) as the primary instrument, nor was it the
first MANPADS attack against an Israeli civilian airline. 

However, it is one of the few MANPADS attacks that has occurred near a
civilian airport outside of a combat or insurgency region, and certainly the
first attack on a civilian air carrier that has been clearly linked to
Al-Qaeda. 

In the Mombasa attack, it now appears that the weapons used were Russian
9M32M Strela 2M (SA-7b Mod. 1 'Grail') systems. The Strela 2M is relatively
simple to operate, and can be deployed quickly. The entire launcher can be
assembled and shouldered in less than 30 seconds. The gunner (except where
an IFF Interrogator is present) acquires the target visually. The ground
power supply unit energises both the seeker and the electronics that are
housed within the grip-stock. This requires up to six seconds. Once visual
acquisition of the target is achieved, the gunner pulls the trigger back
against its mechanical stop. This activates the missile's automatic target
lock and launch circuits. The activation process takes less than one second.


Why the missiles missed 

There is a high probability that two missiles were used in the Mombasa
attack so that one missile could be locked onto each engine of the 757-300.
This attack may have failed for several reasons but, most notably, the
altitude at which the aircraft was engaged. If the aircraft was in fact at
500ft (152m) Above Ground Level (AGL), it would have been well outside of
the minimum engagement range for the Strela 2M, which is 800m. Essentially,
it was too close for the missile seeker to maintain continuous target lock
with its 1.9º field of view. Additionally, as the missile is accelerating to
Mach 1, this low altitude provides little opportunity for it to take
corrective action for intercept should the target disappear momentarily from
the seeker's field of view. 

The current MANPADS threat 

There are currently over 150,000 MANPADS in circulation throughout the
world, with an estimated 350,000 in defence inventories. There are few
MANPADS not available for export sales, while others are produced with that
consideration in mind. Due to the increasing level of technology transfers,
a number of countries have gained a considerable advantage in shortcutting
the research and development process associated with sophisticated MANPADS.
Many of these transfers have occurred within the last five to seven years,
clearly signalling that the proverbial genie is out of the bottle. 

Ground security 

Airports throughout the world have become surrounded by development and lie
in urban areas. This presents a problem, as it increases the potential
locations from which an attack could occur. To properly address the threat,
effective ground security must be achieved through both traditional and
non-traditional techniques. 

One effective measure that airports can implement is regular helicopter
patrols of the surrounding area and corresponding flight corridors that are
in use. Patrol altitudes of 300-500ft. (91-152m) AGL are optimum as they
provide good observation while minimising interference to air traffic.
Although a potential MANPADS strike can occur at a considerable distance
from an airport, helicopter patrols may be most effective up to 12km from
the operation area. This will increase patrol coverage and shorten the
flight time between critical areas. 

These patrols should be regular (30 minute intervals between patrols), but
unscheduled. Patrol routes should also be unpredictable. Air patrols should
have a law enforcement sharpshooter aboard at all times, as this is the only
way to interdict and stop a potential launch in progress. Air patrols should
be aware that they could become a potential target if an operation is
detected. Interdiction, however, is paramount if a launch is to be stopped. 

Comprehensive ground security can also be effective in interdicting
operations using other types of stand-off weapons against both facilities
and aircraft. An excellent example would be the RPG-7, which has a
significant record of downing aircraft below 1,200ft. (366m). Airborne
defence systems might detect the launch, but will be unable to interrupt
such an attack. It is therefore vital that operations be interdicted on the
ground.


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