"Security Being Sacrificed for Speed, Critics Charge"

Monday, October 7, 2002

Security Being Sacrificed for Speed, Critics Charge
Air Safety Week


Programs to tighten security will be tempered by the need for customer
service, according to a new doctrine announced by government officials.
Critics of the policy say it leaves the door open to future security
breaches that could be exploited by wily terrorists. 

The tension between these opposing views was revealed in last week's
meeting of the Aviation Security Advisory Committee (ASAC). During the
proceedings, Adm. James Loy, recently appointed head of the
Transportation Security Administration (TSA) and his top lieutenants
laid out for committee members the status of current security programs
and outlined policies that will guide the way forward. It was the first
public ASAC meeting in nearly a year; the last one took place Dec. 18,
2001. 

Loy said his vision of TSA's role is to provide "world class security
coupled equally to world class customer service." In other words,
protection and throughput must be balanced. To accomplish this, Loy said
that "threat analysis on the one hand and risk management on the other
hand" are the "two defining tools." Additionally, a good dollop of
"common sense" must be added to the mix, Loy said. 

Indeed, the slogan "World Class Security and Customer Service" appeared
on all the briefing slides presented by TSA officials who followed Loy
during the meeting. 

In terms of risk management, procedures that do not contribute
significantly to security will be dispensed with. Loy said the "hassle
factor" of unneeded or outdated security procedures needs to be reduced.
To this end, he explained that the questions typically asked of
passengers ("Did you pack these bags yourself?" etc.) were asked to
prevent unwitting persons from carrying terrorist bombs. However, the
questions are no longer seen as contributing to security and are no
longer required. Similarly, Loy added, "No one is being asked to eat or
drink foodstuffs to prove they are not explosives." 

In terms of reducing the hassle factor, Loy said airport evacuations
resulting from suspected security breaches have decreased more than 30
percent in a recent three-month period. Simplified steps 

To further reduce service interruptions, Loy outlined a three-step
security process: (1) all passengers will receive a boarding pass "up
front," (2) passengers will pass through a robust security screening
checkpoint, and (3) they will pass into a sanitized airport area on the
other side of the security checkpoint. Passenger searches at the gate
area will not be done, although in the past year a number of security
breaches were caught at the gates. 

Requiring passengers to procure boarding passes before presenting
themselves at the security screening checkpoint could require electronic
ticket holders without checked baggage to check in at the front counter.
As such, some of the convenience of holding an e-ticket would be
compromised while contributing to more crowding in the airport area in
front of the security checkpoints. 

Adm. Loy's meaning of the term "sanitized area" was not entirely clear.
For example, sources say that at most airports, airport employees enter
secured areas without screening; it is not clear that this practice will
change. 

While Loy declared that "holes are not a good thing, especially when you
are in the security business," skeptics of his policy approach said
recent decisions may actually have left open or widened holes in the
U.S. aviation security system. And while the briefings of various TSA
officials featured color graphics, the credibility of the presentations
seemed to crumble in the face of questioning over specifics. 

Above all, skeptics questioned the dual objective of security and
service. ASAC member Bob Monetti asked, "Where is service mandated in
the law?" Monetti is president of The Victims of Pan Am Flight 103. The
organization is named for the December 1988 terrorist bombing of a Pan
American B747 over Lockerbie, Scotland. In asking where "service"
appears in the law, Monetti was referring to the Aviation and
Transportation Security Act (ATSA) signed. This legislation, the primary
response to the Sept. 11, 2001, terrorist attacks, established the TSA
and set up numerous deadlines for tightening aviation security. 

Responding to Monetti's question, Loy said, "The harsh reality in our
nation is that we must be attentive to security while accepting the
needs of service." 

Not persuaded, Monetti told the committee, "The victims of Flight 103
will be even more persistent, and maybe a little obnoxious, about this
issue of security and service." 

In a separate interview, Monetti pointed to the dual mandate of the
Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) to promote air commerce while
regulating the industry to maintain safety. After the 1996 fatal crash
of a ValuJet DC-9, the FAA was stripped by Congress of its dual mandate
and given the sole mission of oversight for safety. Monetti and others
see the same mistake with security - assuming a dual role of security
and service will ineluctably compromise security. 

"Equating service and security is like the FAA's problem of trying to
promote and regulate," Monetti said. Only in this case, service is not
part of the TSA's legislated mandate. "It's not in the law," Monetti
said. 

"Yes, security has to be aware of customer service, but the reason we
had the 9/11 attacks was because security was subordinated to service,"
he recalled. "This development is mind-boggling. It's like no one died
last year," he groused. 

ASAC member Chris Witkowski shared Monetti's concern. Representing the
Association of Flight Attendants (AFA), Witkowski recalled one of the
primary conclusions of the 1997 White House Commission on Aviation
Safety and Security: "The federal government should consider aviation
security as a national security issue." 

"Is customer service now being facilitated in the name of national
security?" Witkowski asked rhetorically. 

The concept of balancing security with efficiency is not entirely new.
When the TSA was first formed, Transportation Secretary Norman Mineta
outlined three guiding principles. Two of the three framed the security
process in terms of protection and efficiency. Swiss cheese 

ASAC member Paul Hudson said recent decisions might have opened some
"major security gaps." Hudson, director of the Aviation Consumer Action
Project (ACAP), ticked off more than half a dozen examples: 

   1. The three questions asked by passengers at check-in, designed to
help spot dupes unwittingly carrying terrorist bombs, were scrapped, but
no alternative questions were put in their place. 

   2. Allowing liquids to go through security unchecked. "Terrorists are
looking at them," Hudson said, suggesting that a coffee container could
easily be filled with nitroglycerin explosive. 

   3. Prospectively eliminating passenger searches at boarding gates. If
layered security is the best security, the elimination of final checks
at the boarding area strips away one layer, leaving only the single
security checkpoint in Loy's concept. 

   4. The registered traveler program, which Loy is considering. "That
may be okay for airport employees, but not for passengers," Hudson
declared. 

   5. The non-use of hardened unit load devices, or HULDs, which are
strengthened to contain the explosive force of a terrorist bomb. "These
could be used for checked baggage, cargo and mail, as a backup should
hidden explosives get through screening," Hudson said. "But no one is
going to order them unless their use is mandated," he added. 

In its markup of the Aviation Industry Stabilization and Reform Act
(H.R. 5506), the House Aviation Subcommittee added an amendment
requiring the TSA to "study blast-resistant cargo container technology"
but did not include a commandment to use these devices. 

It may be useful to recall that at the last ASAC meeting in December
2001, one of the presenters said that FAA research had proven
conclusively that explosives in the overhead bins were far more
hazardous to the structure of the aircraft than bombs in the belly. 

At that meeting the presenter said the FAA did not plan any actions to
more closely scrutinize or restrict carry-on baggage. While Congress has
evidenced interest in explosive-resistant containers, there have been no
moves out of the FAA or Congress to tighten the carry-on rules. 

   6. Not mandating positive passenger bag match (PPBM) for continuing
flights. Thus, a terrorist could board a flight with a bomb in checked
baggage, debark at an intermediate stop, and the bag containing the
explosive device would remain on the airplane for the next flight
segment. 

Last week the House Aviation Subcommittee rejected an amendment offered
by ranking member Rep. James Oberstar (D-Minn.) that would have required
PPBM for connecting flights. A distinctly unhappy Oberstar said, "This
is the Achilles Heel of our airline security system." 

"A terrorist can sneak a bomb on board a plane in his checked luggage,
get off the plane at a connecting airport, and the bomb stays on board.
That's what happened to Pan Am 103 when it blew up over Lockerbie,
Scotland, in 1988," he expounded. 

   7. Eliminating the "sizer" templates on some X-ray machines at
security checkpoints to speed passenger processing. The templates
restrict the size of carry-on bags - those that do not pass through the
opening in the template must be checked as hold baggage. 

This development reduces security by presenting screeners with larger
carry-on bags that may have to be hand-searched for weapons and
explosives. As the saying goes, when the goal is to find the needle in
the proverbial haystack, it may be useful to reduce the size of the
haystack. 

The templates also promote safety by helping to prevent overloading of
the overhead bins with oversized luggage. These heavy items can fall out
during turbulence, and in crash landings, emergency evacuations have
been confounded by spillage of items in the overhead bins onto the
passengers below. 

The AFA had urged Loy's predecessor, John Magaw, to keep the templates.
The TSA rebuffed the AFA plea. A TSA official said the templates are not
required and therefore "don't have to be in place." 

"When we move into all airports, those templates will come down," he
added, referring to the Nov. 19 deadline to federalize security
screening at the nation's airports. Questions and non-answers 

In addition to these developments, some ASAC members were disappointed
with the vagueness of answers to specific questions. For example, Hudson
asked Mike Robinson, associated TSA administrator for aviation
operations, about the hole in security left open by not requiring PPBM
for continuing flights. 

"We have other systems to augment security; PPBM is [just] one of the
approaches," Robinson replied. 

Winona Vernon, TSA director of airport security, declared that 51
terrorist attack scenarios have been examined. Three included placing a
bomb on an aircraft through the catering system, placing a bomb on an
aircraft by an insider (an employee with access) and by piggybacking, in
which a member of a terrorist plot passes through a security portal when
it opens for a person with authorized access. 

"Did one of your 51 scenarios include the attempted ticket counter
massacre at Los Angeles International Airport?" Hudson asked. He was
referring to the Egyptian national who killed two persons, an El Al
ticket counter employee and a passenger waiting in line, in a July 4,
2002, attack. The Egyptian, shot dead by an El Al security agent, was
found with multiple weapons and a large supply of ammunition. 

"That's for the second phase," Vernon replied. 

The TSA seems to be reviewing threats on the air operations side first
and intends to consider the terminal side later. This may be backwards,
as the 9/11 attacks resulted from a flagrant penetration on the terminal
side of the airport, as have some prominent cases since, such as the
Dec. 22, 2001, Richard Reid "shoe bomber" fiasco on American Airlines
[AMR] Flight 63 (see ASW, July 22). 

ASAC member Mike Cronin asked, "Does the security plan include universal
screening of everybody with access to secure areas of the airport?"
Cronin is executive director of the Coalition of Airline Pilots
Associations (CAPA). His organization has been particularly concerned
about tightening access to supposedly "secure" areas of the airport. 

"That's to be determined based on the threat," Vernon responded. Her
answer may contradict what Loy said about the entire area beyond the
security screening checkpoints being "sanitized." Loy had explicitly
said everybody in this area, to include airport employees,
concessionaires, passengers, and other persons, would be screened. While
he may not have been entirely clear on the nature of the screening, he
was explicit about the population to be screened. 

Cronin followed up with a second question: "Doesn't the Aviation
Transportation Security Act require all those who enter the secured area
of an airport to be screened?" 

Vernon replied that universal screening was a policy decision and
universal screening may not be required. This position directly
contradicts the act, Section 106(A) of which requires, "as soon as
practicable .... screening or inspection of all individuals, goods,
property, vehicles, and other equipment before entry into a secured area
of an airport in the United States." 

Vernon's answers "were a shock to me," Cronin said. "They were evasive
and leave an enormous loophole of unscreened employees with access," he
added. "We will be totally reliant on the criminal record background
check," he explained, pointing out that such a check falls far short of
even a minimalist standard for employee screening. "All you need is one
hijacker and one co-opted employee" to carry out an attack, Cronin said.


Cargo security was another point of concern. Too much cargo is coming
onto airports for shipment that is not being screened, fretted one ASAC
member. 

TSA officials said they believe they are in compliance with ATSA,
Section 110 of which requires screening of air cargo "as soon as
practicable." 

Elaine Dezenski, a TSA cargo security official, said, "We are in
compliance because unknown shippers are banned." 

Cronin said, "They have decided that known shippers provide adequate
security and meet the definition in the act of 'screened cargo.' "
(Cont'd on p. 6) 

He pointed to tougher language in pending legislation that will set
specific goalposts for cargo security. This legislation may be dead, as
an amendment extending the deadline for 100 percent explosives detection
to one full year so outraged one senator that the bill was placed on
hold and may never reach the floor for a vote. Nonetheless, the bill's
provisions about cargo security provide a window into the current
thinking in Congress. Of note, this pending legislation could close a
loophole. The ATSA legislation called for screening of cargo carried in
all-cargo aircraft, not for cargo carried in the belly holds of
passenger jets, leaving a gaping hole in security, sources said. Indeed,
the hole represents some 22 percent of all cargo. According to the Bill
Wilkening, TSA director of cargo security, some 12.5 million tons of
cargo was enplaned in 2000, and 2.8 million tons of it was carried on
passenger planes. The legislation specifically addresses the need for a
comparable "known shipper" program for passenger aircraft as that
applied to all-cargo aircraft. 

During the course of his remarks, Loy revealed his views on a number of
security issues: 

Trusted traveler. "I am well aware of the popularity of the trusted
traveler concept," he said, adding that the term "registered traveler"
may be preferable to avoid the stigma for those passengers not in this
program of being characterized as "untrusted travelers." 

An airport worker identification program will be "the first step" in
assessing the viability of the registered traveler concept as a means of
expediting security. 

Meeting the Nov. 19 deadline to federalize all airport screening. Loy
said as part of his "common sense approach" he is looking at deputizing
local law enforcement officers at smaller airports to meet the Nov. 19
deadline. 

According to the TSA's Robinson, with the deadline less than 50 days
away, passenger screeners have been federalized at 140 airports, but
checked- baggage screeners have been federalized at just nine airports.
"It is our intent to cross-train some passenger and baggage screeners,"
he said. 

Some ASAC members said that with only a fraction of all airport
screening federalized, PPBM takes on added importance. 

Arming pilots with firearms. Loy said, "When the Senate votes 6-to-1 and
the House votes 3-to-1 [to arm pilots] I have to take that seriously." 

"But there are issues of cost, liability and international jurisdiction"
associated with any program to arm pilots, he said. One of the big
challenges he sees is the training. "Just like taking airplanes out of
service for [hardened door installation], pilots will have to be taken
out of service for training," he said. The TSA estimates a massive
training program costing nearly a billion dollars in the first year to
train tens of thousands of pilots in firearms protocols and use. The Air
Line Pilots Association (ALPA) takes a different view, estimating that
the number of pilots volunteering for the program would be modest, and
that the training costs are less than a quarter of the TSA's $900
million-plus estimate. 

Cronin said CAPA agrees completely with the ALPA position. "Adm. Loy's
cost estimates are based on a wildly inflated notion of how many pilots
will be trained the first year and, in our view, wildly inflated costs
of training each pilot." 

"Our own estimates, based on a plan proposed by former FBI officials are
about $2,000 per pilot in a one-week course," Cronin added. "If 10,000
pilots were trained the first year, that would be an initial cost of $20
million. The wild estimates may be a ploy to kill the program, along
with airline pleas about scheduling disruptions from pilots absent for
[firearms] training, even while hundreds of pilots are being
furloughed," Cronin said. 

"The admiral's remarks about liability and local and international
jurisdictional issues merit comment. Both versions of the legislation
[to arm pilots] were crafted to relieve the carriers of liability and
the pilots would be 'federal flight deck officers' precisely so there
would be no more problems with state and international laws than for
other federal officers," Cronin countered. "Loy has never explained why
these problems are more difficult for pilots than they are for air
marshals." 

Capt. Steve Luckey, chairman of the ALPA security committee, reiterated
his belief that pilots should have firearms in the cockpit. Armed air
marshals, he pointed out, will be sitting in the cabin. "I want the
defensive capability between the threat and the principal point of
protection," Luckey said. 

"You don't put the troops outside the fort," Luckey added. Process
problems 

Larger issues emerged at last week's ASAC meeting centering on
participation, process and committee composition. 

In terms of participation, TSA's Wilkening pointed out that some cargo
security procedures will be issued only to cargo carriers and will not
be presented as part of the well-established procedure for public
comment. In effect, some new rules will be issued only to the parties
being regulated by the government. This process would bypass any
involvement of ASAC members. The AFA's Witkowski said, "If we want to
proceed in any meaningful way, the TSA will have to involve
non-regulated parties." 

As examples, he pointed out that the pilots unions and passenger groups
would have a high degree of interest in proposed security procedures for
air cargo. These groups are represented on the ASAC but would not be
involved in any restrictive distribution of new cargo security rules.
"The ASAC was begun out of concern for the Federal Advisory Committee
Act," Witkowski said, referring to the 1972 legislation created
specifically to involve a wide range of experts and the public in
government policy issues. 

It should be noted that the Aviation and Transportation Security Act
granted the TSA some relief from the Administrative Procedures Act, the
law that requires public notice and comment on pending regulations. This
provision was provided to permit issues requiring secrecy and
confidentiality to remain secure. The TSA appears to be interpreting
this authority broadly. 

In terms of process, ASAC member Duane McGray, said the advisory role of
the committee seems questionable. McGray is president of the Airport Law
Enforcement Agency Network (ALEAN). "It doesn't seem like a whole lot of
advice is coming from the committee and being implemented," he said.
"Rather, ASAC is briefed by the FAA" and now TSA officials. McGrath
suggested this role is entirely too passive: "None of us will be here if
we have many more incidents like 9/11." 

In terms of committee composition, the issue of "stakeholders" was
raised. Presently, ASAC members include airlines, industry associations,
unions, and some passenger groups, but key sources of advice are
missing. Examples include academics, some of whom would bring to the
committee considerable expertise on security. For example, Florida's
Embry-Riddle Aeronautical University has an aviation security program.
Dr. Arnold Barnett at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology comes to
mind, also. Barnett is a leading expert in PPBM. 

Designers and manufacturers of aviation security equipment are not
represented on the ASAC. Nor are the interests of foreign air carriers
represented. 

And, finally, Monetti pointed out, other passenger groups, such as the
National Air Disaster Alliance (NADA), composed of individuals who have
been in air crashes or lost family members in crashes, are not on the
committee. Other groups, formed out of the 9/11 disaster, also should be
considered for membership. 

ACAP's Hudson remarked on the process: 

"Had the ASAC met as frequently after 9/11 as most ASAC members
requested, security would probably be better today and at least the TSA
would be better informed on the ramifications of its decisions. The
Department of Transportation (DOT) and the TSA have until this meeting
excluded passenger, public and terrorist victim representatives on its
various task forces." 

In brief, the base of advice needs to be expanded, and the committee
needs to be less passive and more active. Some ASAC members alleged that
a whole process of informal, closed-door advice to the TSA is taking
place by industry advocates, supplanting ASAC and consigning it to the
backwaters. >> Hudson, e- mail ACAP1971@xxxxxxx; Cronin e-mail
mpcronin@xxxxxxxxx; Luckey e-mail SALOO7@xxxxxxx; Monetti e-mail
bobmonet@xxxxxxxxxxxxxx << 'We Failed the Final Exam' 

Remarks of Bob Monetti, president of The Victims of Pan Am Flight 103: 

"We have been outspoken advocates of aviation security since 1989. Sept.
11, 2001, was our final exam and we failed - all of us - badly. Some
3,000 people were murdered, and the [aviation security] system was shown
to be virtually nonexistent. 

"No one, no one lost their job because of the multiple failures on 9/11.
Okay, [that's] not entirely true. Joe Lawless [director at Boston's]
Logan International Airport got sacked, while the FAA people who were
actually responsible for the failures got promoted. 

"I was severely depressed, and I hope you all were, too. I promise all
of you that we, the victims of Flight 103, will be even more persistent,
and maybe a little obnoxious in the future, about the constant
tug-of-war that goes on between world class security and world class
customer service, also known as on- time departures." Eliminating Gate
Searches Could Leave Holes in Security 

Below, some examples where breaches were caught at the boarding gates. 

   * Nov. 4, 2001 - Chicago O'Hare International Airport: Subash Bahadar
Gurung,
27, was arrested on charges that the night before, he tried to bring
knives, chemical spray and a stun gun onto United Airlines Flight 1085
bound for Omaha. Screeners at an airport security checkpoint put him
through a 12-minute wand search and confiscated two knives. But they did
not notice a white plastic bag with seven folding knives, a stun gun and
a small can labeled "tear gas/pepper spray." These items were discovered
by airline employees at the gate. 

   * May 6, 2002 - New Orleans: Carlos Stephens carried two loaded
semiautomatic
weapons in a backpack through a security checkpoint. The guns were
discovered during a random search at the Continental Airlines gate area.


   * May 25, 2002 - Singapore: A bodyguard accompanying Libyan leader
Moammar
Gadhafi's son on a trip to the World Cup Finals in Seoul, Korea, was
stopped at the boarding gate, where security personnel discovered and
seized a submachine gun, five clips, a pistol, revolver, and a knife. 

   * August 29, 2002 - Vaesteraas Airport, Sweden: Kerim Sadok Chatty
was arrested
as he prepared to board a Ryanair flight to England with a gun in his
carry-on baggage. The 29-year-old Stockholm resident was one of a group
of 20 headed to a conference in Britain of Salafi Muslims - a sect that
includes some of Osama Bin Laden's terrorist allies. London-based "shoe
bomber" Richard Reid, who is in the U.S. awaiting trial after allegedly
trying to blow up an American Airlines flight, is a Salafi Muslim. 

   * Early September 2002: New York Daily News reporters boarded 14
flights on six
major air carriers at 11 airports over the Labor Day weekend carrying
box cutters, razor knives, pepper spray and other prohibited items. Not
a single airport security checkpoint spotted these weapons. 

Sources: Airport Security Report and various news sources 'Key Targets'
for Aviation Security 

Remarks of Transportation Secretary Norman Mineta at Homeland Security
Summit, Nov. 27, 2001 (extracts): 

"We have identified key targets at which we will aim. For example, our
goal in passenger screening is 'No weapons, no waiting.' 

"Our goal for cargo screening is 'No danger, no delay.' 

"The 'On board, on duty' goal for the Federal Air Marshal program
entails getting several thousand new air marshals trained and deployed
on flights." 

Source: www.dot.gov/affairs/112701sp.htm Don't Terminate the Templates 

The rejected appeal of the Association of Flight Attendants: 

"Baggage sizing templates (e.g., plates with a 9 by 14 inch opening
through which carry-on bags must fit) are the only effective method ever
implemented to keep oversized baggage out of ...the cabin. 

"Proper safeguards against oversized carry-on baggage play an important
part in airline security. Oversized carry-on or roller baggage makes
proper inspection more difficult, increasing the chances for dangerous
weapons or items to be brought aboard for hijacking or sabotage. 

"In 1996, the FAA Aviation Security Advisory Committee, which included
representatives of the Department of Transportation, Secret Service,
FBI, and Air Transport Association, as well as AFA, the Air Line Pilots
Association and two passenger groups, approved the Domestic Baseline
Security Report. [It] recommended, without exception: Develop uniform
standards to restrict the size, type, and amount of carry-on property
and provide for strict enforcement. This would facilitate more thorough
inspection of carry-ons to intercept dangerous items. 

"The carriers who effectively tried to screen out oversized bags with a
template at the screening checkpoint are now asked by TSA not to enforce
a size limit at the screening checkpoint. 

"TSA has taken a huge step backward by removing the only effective tool
to limit the size of carry-on bags, increasing the potential for
security problems." 

Source: AFA Raising the Bar on Air Cargo Security 

The Aviation Security Improvement Act (extracts) 

   * Cargo carried on passenger aircraft. The Under Secretary of
Transportation
shall establish an industry-wide pilot program [italics in original]
database of known shippers of cargo that is to be transported in
passenger aircraft. The Under Secretary shall use the results of the
pilot program to improve the known shipper program. 

   * Cargo carried on all-cargo aircraft. Air carriers operating
all-cargo aircraft
[shall] have an approved plan for security of their air operations area,
the cargo placed on such aircraft, and persons having access to their
aircraft on the ground or in flight. 

Source: S. 2449 Union Challenges Cost of Arming Pilots 

The Air Line Pilots Association (ALPA) contends that the cost of arming
pilots could be significantly lower than what the Transportation
Security Administration (TSA) has estimated. 

The U.S. House of Representatives and the U.S. Senate have passed
different version of bills to allow arming pilots, and TSA projections
are based on legislative language that 85,000 pilots will participate in
the program. ALPA and other airline pilot groups insist that in a
volunteer program, only about 25,000 pilots will meet necessary
standards and training requirements, thereby dramatically reducing the
cost of the program. 

On Oct. 2 Secretary of Transportation Norman Mineta told an audience at
Embry-Riddle Aeronautical University in Daytona Beach, Fla., that he
expects Congress will oppose a massive program because of its high
costs. 

Cost Contentions 

Item                                    ALPA           TSA            

Number of federal flight deck officers  25,000 pilots  85,000 pilots  

Start-up cost                           $100 million   $900 million   

Annual cost                             $25 million    $250 million   

Cost per pilot                          $4,000         $10,600


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